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THE 1970 HAGUE CONVENTION
R. H. MANKIEWICZ*
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970, provides inter alia that,
if the contracting state in which the hijacker and his accomplices are
found does not extradite them to the state wishing to prosecute them, it
shall submit the case to its own competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. Professor Mankiewicz points out that this convention is a
milestone both in the general development of an international criminal
air law and in the fight against aerial hijacking, specifically. The article
discusses the scope and meaning of the provisions of the new convention
and suggests that a welcome precedent has been established for similar
rules with respect to other unlawful interferences with international
civil aviation. In his introduction, the author outlines some general prob-
lems arising in connection with the prosecution and punishment of
crimes committed on board aircraft.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Problems with respect to offenses committed on board aircraft in
flight.O FFENSES committed on board aircraft against the criminal laws of
overflown states have special features normally absent from offenses
perpetrated on the ground. First, even minor offenses such as assault or
a fist-fight between passengers may endanger the safety of other pas-
sengers even though it may not require the intervention of a flight crew
member who would thereby be distracted from his in-flight duties. Sec-
ond, in regions of the world where high-speed aircraft cross several
national borders within minutes, it might be difficult, even impossible, to
determine the country in which the offense was committed. Third, except
where the state of registration of the aircraft has made the law of the
*Professor of Law, University of Sherbrooke; Member, Board of Advisors, THE
JOURNAL OF Am LAW AND COMMERCE.
1For a more detailed survey see Mankiewicz, Aspects du Problems du Droit Penal
de l'aviation Internationale, 1958 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 112;
Mankiewicz, Le Droit Penal de l'aviation, 4 McGILL LJ. 13 (1957). See generally
Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo
Convention, 53 VA. L. REV. 509, 513 (1967).
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flag applicable thereto,' if the act is committed over the high seas the
offense may not be punishable because of the lack of an applicable na-
tional law. Even the doctrine of the law of the flag is not necessarily a
panacea." Finally, the alleged offender may disembark in a state which
either has no jurisdiction or, having jurisdiction, has no desire to exer-
cise it. Moreover, that state may also be unwilling to extradite the of-
fender to a state where he could be punished. In addition, it may happen
that a state having jurisdiction may not even request extradition because
of the expense and legal difficulties involved.
When the multiple aspects of these and related problems were dis-
cussed by the Seventh International Congress of Criminal Law, held in
Athens in 1956, several jurists' suggested that the proper solution is to
adopt a rule whereby any offense committed on board an aircraft in
flight would be an international crime in the same way as other inter-
national crimes such as genocide, white slave trade, counterfeiting, or
narcotics traffic.'
The Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion has considered these problems since the early 1950s in connection
with its overall study of the legal status of aircraft.' However, the first
convention resulting from that study, namely the Convention on Offenses
and Other Acts Committed on Aircraft in Flight, signed in Tokyo on
September 14, 1963,' did not attempt to solve the problems.
2. The Tokyo Convention
In addition to explicitly recognizing the well-established rule of inter-
national law that "the [sitate of registration of the aircraft is competent
to exercise jurisdiction over offenses and acts committed on board ......
and further requiring each contracting state to "take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction as the [sitate of registration
over offenses committed on board an aircraft registered in such [sitate.
" the main achievement of the Tokyo Convention was specify the
'This has been done in many countries, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, Canada,
Ceylon, France, Greece, Mexico, United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries.
3 See Regina v. Martin, [1956] 2 All E.R. 86 (H.L.); Jennings, International Civil
Aviation and the Law, 22 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 191 (1945).
4 See Reports Submitted to the 7th International Congress of Criminal Law, [1956]
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PANAL (Nos. 3 & 4), 1957 REVUE (Nos. 1 & 2).
SINT'L LAW ASS'N, THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1952) and FORTY-THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT (1958).
ICAO, WD/LC/LEGAL STATUS 10 and 24; ICAO Doc. No. 8302- LC/150 (1963).
7 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. 6768, art. 3 [here-
inafter cited as Tokyo Convention]. The official text of the Convention is available
through ICAO Headquarters, Montreal, Canada, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 (1963). The
authentic English text appears in Boyle & Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 30 J. Am L. & COMM. 305,
326-52 (1964).
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powers of the commander of an aircraft engaged in international flight
"when he has reasonable ground to believe that a person has committed
...offenses against penal laws ...or acts which ...jeopardize the
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein, or which
jeopardize good order and discipline on board."' Nevertheless, by ac-
cepting a proposal first made by delegates from the United States and
Venezuela,' the Tokyo Convention, albeit in a very summary fashion,
went far beyond problems arising from the legal status of aircraft and
became the first international instrument to deal with the unlawful
seizure of aircraft. Article 11 of the Convention provides that in cases
of such seizure all contracting states "shall assist in restoring control of
the aircraft to its lawful commander. . . ." and that the contracting state
in which the aircraft lands shall "permit its passengers and crew to con-
tinue their journey as soon as practical .... [and] ... return the aircraft
and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession. '"1 Although
the expression "unlawful seizure of aircraft," which is used in the title
of Chapter IV" of the convention, is not otherwise defined, it follows
from article 11 that it is any act by which "a person on board has unlaw-
fully committed by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure,
or wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight, or is about to
commit such an act."
Since the twelve ratifying signatures required for the enforcement of
the Convention were not forthcoming with the desired speed and, since
hijacking and other acts of aerial sabotage rapidly became the order of
the day, the Assembly and the Council of ICAO made repeated appeals
to contracting states for early ratification and even suggested application
of the principles of the Convention before formal ratification."
3. The Meaning of "Unlawful Seizure" and "Unlawful Deviation" of
Aircraft13
Hijacking, which is not "aerial piracy" within the meaning of the
Geneva Convention,' is basically committed by a person on board an
aircraft. However, aircraft can, and indeed have been, seized and devi-
ated unlawfully by persons on the ground, or even by a willing aircraft
I For general discussions see Fitzgerald, The Tokyo Convention of 1963, 1964 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 19; Golstein, Le Convention Relative aux Infractions, 1964 REVUE FRAN-
CAISE DE DROIT AERIEN 191; M. LrrvINE, DROIT AERIEN 130 (1970).
9 ICAO Doc. No. 8302-LC/150, vol. II, at 102 (1963).
10 Tokyo Convention, art. 11.
I The said article 11 is the only article in Chapter IV - Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft.
2 Assembly Resolutions A16-36 and A17-2, ICAO Doc. No. 8770 (1965).
" See 1968 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 770, 775.
14 For a discussion of the relationship of "piracy" and "hijacking" see Mr. Samuels'
discussion, supra at 163-70.
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commander.1" Consequently, the Resolution on Air Law, adopted by the
Fifty-Third Conference of the International Law Association in Buenos-
Aires in 1968, aimed at the suppression of unlawful deviation of air-
craft in general, hijacking being only one means of committing that
offense. " However, according to established ICAO terminology as well
as to most commentators,' the expression "unlawful seizure of aircraft"
applies only to acts of unlawful interference with the control of an air-
craft committed by a person on board.
4. Special Problems of Prosecution
Although the criminal laws of many states do not define nor punish
the specific offense of hijacking, this does not raise particular difficulties
in prosecuting the "unlawful seizure of aircraft." In most instances any
act of hijacking involves several offenses under the criminal laws of all
states. 8 Indeed, experience with the enforcement of the rules of general
criminal law in the United States and elsewhere has shown that such
offenses are not necessarily minor and can result in severe penalties, in-
cluding life imprisonment. 9
The peculiar difficulty in the prosecution of the perpetrator of an un-
lawful seizure of an aircraft stems from the fact that by the time he leaves
the aircraft, he normally is in a state which, he expects, will grant him
asylum or of which he is a citizen. Inevitably, he will not be extradited
to the state where the hijacking took place or that may have jurisdiction
under the "law of the flag."' Furthermore, no guarantee exists that the
state of disembarkation will be willing to exercise its own jurisdiction
under these circumstances, even though that state is one of those within
which the hijacking, a "continuing offense,"'. has been committed. As a
result, the hijacker and his companions are likely to go unpunished,
"1 See, e.g., the problems raised by the capture of the aircraft carrying M. Ben Bella,
P. de La Pradelle, 1956 REVUE GENERALE DE L'AIR 233 and the Tchombe case, E. du
Pontavice, 1970 REVUE GENERALE DE L'AIR 276, 278.
"'INT'L LAW ASS'N, FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, B.A. Consult. Ass., 1st Sess., at
xxi, at 112 (1968).
'r See, e.g., Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 695,
696 (1969).
', For Canadian as well as general criminal law, see articles cited in note 1 supra.
See also ICAO Docs. Al 7-WP/34 (Sweden), Al 7-34 (The Netherlands), Al 7-57
(Yugoslavia), Al 7-114 (Australia).
"'For punishment under United States criminal law, see United States v. Bearden,
304 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 372 U.S. 252 (1963) (per
curiam), obstruction of commerce charge aff'd, 320 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 922 (1964). See also Tribunal de Grande Instance de Corbeil, 1969;
REVUE GENERALE DE L'AIR ET DE L'EsPACE 358 (1969) (French punishment); Tribunal
of the French Military Government of Berlin, 1970 (German punishment); JURIs CLAS-
SEUR PERIODIQUE 16.540.
"'See 1968 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 518, 522. ICAO WD
LC/DT 744-2 (22).
21See Samuels, supra at 167, n.27.
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particularly since they normally will avoid entering a state which has
and will exercise jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if it is agreed by treaty that irrespective of the
place where the unlawful seizure was committed, its perpetrator and
accomplices can be prosecuted and punished in any state where they
happen to be, then, while they may in fact remain unpunished, they will
be confined to the state of disembarkation. Thus, effective repression
requires the offense to be made international. A suggestion to this effect
was made by the observer of the International Law Association to the
ICAO Legal Committee," but none of its members was willing to lend
support. The Hague Conference, as will be seen, reversed the stand
taken by the ICAO Legal Committee.
II. THE 1970 HAGUE CONVENTION"
Before going into a critical analysis of the rules of the Convention, this
writer wishes to point to the remarkable feat achieved by The Hague
Convention which was to provide that, additionally to the previously-
agreed jurisdictions of the state of registration, or of the place of resi-
dence of the lessee, of the aircraft and of the state where the hijacked
aircraft lands (with the hijacker on board), jurisdiction rests also with
the state in the territory of which "the alleged offender is found."
whether or not the offense was committed in that territory.
1. The Scope of the Convention
It is noteworthy that the Convention neither uses nor defines the ex-
pression "unlawful seizure of aircraft" which, however, appears in its
title." Instead, article 1 specifies the acts constituting "the offense" to
which the Convention applies and which, in accordance with article 2,
"each contracting State undertakes to make . . . punishable by severe
penalties." With slight drafting changes, the description of these acts is
the same in article 1 of The Hague Convention as in the aforementioned
article 11 of the Tokyo Convention. Accordingly, the offense to which
The Hague Convention applies is committed by "any person who on
board aircraft in flight, unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any
22 ICAO WD LC/DT 744-2 (22).
" For the proceedings of the ICAO Legal Committee and its subcommittee which
prepared the draft convention submitted to The Hague Conference see ICAO Doc. No.
8838 at 103; ICAO Doc. No. 8877, at 23; Mankiewicz, 1969 ANNUARE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 462 and 1970 REVUE FRANCAIS DE DROIT AERIEN 141.
4Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 16, 1970, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8920, art. 11 [hereinafter cited as Hague Conven-
tion].
2 Contrary to the 1963 Tokyo Convention and the 1971 Montreal Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of International Civil Aviation, The
1970 Hague Convention has no preamble.
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other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of that aircraft,
or attempts to perform any such act."
In accordance with this definition, only a seizure effected by force,
threat of force or intimidation is an "unlawful seizure" within the mean-
ing of the new Convention." The words "any other form of intimidation"
are to be construed in the light of the authentic French text of the Con-
vention, from which these words are absent. They refer only to moral
compulsion which is also comprised in the French word "violence."
Since, under article 1, the act must be committed by a person "on
board an aircraft in flight," the Convention does not apply to an attempt
to seize or exercise control of an aircraft by a person on the ground or
in another aircraft. This limitation of the Convention's scope is unfor-
tunate. In fact, proposals had been made both within the ICAO Legal
Committee and Sub-Committee and at The Hague Conference to extend
"unlawful seizure" to acts committed by persons outside the aircraft or
while the aircraft is not in flight." The Conference, however, rejected
the extension by thirty-five votes, with fifteen votes in favor of passage
and fourteen abstentions.
This decision has had an unfavorable influence on the application of
the Convention to accomplices. The Convention clearly applies to an
accomplice under article 1, but because of the manner in which the
article is drafted such complicity is covered only if the accomplice was
also on board an aircraft in flight. 8
The expression "in flight" appearing in article 3 was defined in the
Legal Committee's draft in accordance with the definition used in article
1 of the Tokyo Convention, but the Diplomatic Conference rightly sub-
stituted the definition appearing in article 5 of that convention. Hence,
an aircraft is considered to be "in flight" from the moment when all
external doors are closed following embarkation," not only from the
moment when power is applied for take-off; it ceases to be "in flight"
"when any such door is opened for disembarkation," not at the prior
moment when the aircraft has come to a final stop. This limitation leaves
outside the scope of the Convention any hijacking initiated or attempted
before the closing or after the opening of the aircraft's doors. As a con-
sequence, such acts are punishable only under the law of the state where
21 During the preparatory work in the ICAO Legal Committee, as well as at The
Hague Conference, several proposals were submitted with a view toward adding fraudu-
lent maneuvers, deceptions and similar acts as means of committing the offense, but
none of these proposals received wide support. See note 22 supra. The proceedings and
minutes of The Hague Conference are not yet published.
217 See 1970 REVUE, supra note 23.
18 A proposal to eliminate that restriction by redrafting article 1 had been made un-
successfully by the delegate of Israel during the debates of the ICAO Legal Committee.
ICAO Doc. No. 8877, at 22 (1969). It was renewed at The Hague Conference by the
delegate of the Netherlands, but was rejected by the Conference by 35 votes against,
24 in favor and 11 abstentions. ICAO Doc. SA 23 (1970).
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committed; the jurisdictional articles of the new Convention do not
apply thereto. Furthermore, it follows that such acts are punished mere-
ly by the general criminal or air law of the concerned state, unless
special legislation is introduced for punishing unlawful seizure com-
mitted or attempted on the ground."
A further, equally undesirable restriction is found in the third para-
graph of article 3, which limits the offense described in article 1 to
"unlawful seizure" of aircraft committed during flight with an "inter-
national character." This "international character" is defined rather
curiously: according to article 3, the Convention applies only if the
place of take-off or the place of actual landing is situated outside the
state of registration of the aircraft. Under this rule, the relevant place of
landing is not necessarily the one specified in the time-table or in the
flight plan of the aircraft. Hence, if a hijacking is committed or attempted
on board a Canadian aircraft flying from Montreal to New York City,
for example, and the aircraft returns immediately to Montreal or
Toronto (rather than landing in New York City or elsewhere outside
Canadian territory), the unlawful act is outside the scope: of the Con-
vention."0
Generally, the Convention applies to all flights ending actually in a
state other than the one from which the aircraft took-off. It intended to
exclude all "domestic" flights; i.e. if the places of take-off and actual
landing are within the same state. Nevertheless, it follows from article
3 that the Convention does apply in the latter case, provided the state is
not the state of registration of the aircraft.
In other words, the Convention applies to "domestic flights" outside
the state of registration. Hence, it is rather difficult to understand why
it is inapplicable to domestic flights within that state. In support of that
exclusion it is argued that the unlawful seizure of an aircraft within the
state of registration falls automatically under that state's jurisdiction and
thus does not give rise to any international legal problem. This argu-
ment is weak, however, as it applies with equal force when the departure,
hijacking and actual landing take place in the same state, if that state is
not the one of registration. Moreover, the argument is illogical if one
considers that the Convention does apply in such a case, even though
the foreign registered aircraft, which has taken-off and actually landed
within the same state, in fact is operated by an airline of that same state
under a charter, lease or interchange agreement. Since such case of a
purely "domestic" hijacking is treated as "international," it is surprising
to discover that the sophisticated drafting of article 3 results in preventing
2 The mere ratification of the Convention and its domestic application would not
achieve this end. See 1970 REVUE, supra note 23.
30 Such seizure has actually taken place and its perpetrators have been punished
under French criminal Law. See Tribunal de Grande Instance de Corbeil, supra note 19.
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the application of the Convention when the places of take-off and actual
landing, although situated within the state of registration, in fact are
separated by the high seas or by a foreign state.
These fine distinctions appearing in article 3 are regrettable, for any
hijacked aircraft, whether on a domestic or on an international flight,
presents an obvious and serious hazard to both international and do-
mestic aviation. The Convention should apply to any unlawful seizure
of aircraft, the geographical location of the places of departure and
landing, as well as the nationality of the aircraft, notwithstanding."
A possible difficulty arising from the link between the nationality of
the aircraft and the scope of the Convention concerned the latter's ap-
plication to unlawful seizure of aircraft operated by an international
operating agency. According to the resolution of the ICAO Council
December 14, 1967, relating to the application of article 77 of the
Chicago Convention," these aircraft are not registered in any particular
state;" hence, their unlawful seizure would always fall within the scope
of The Hague Convention, irrespective of the location of the places of
take-off and landing in a particular state. Article 5, to which refers
article 3, paragraph 4, is intended to avoid this problem, however, by
providing that the contracting states that are parties to a joint air trans-
port operating agency shall, "by appropriate means, designate for each
aircraft the [s]tate among them which shall exercise the jurisdiction and
have the attributes of the [s]tate of registration .... [and] ... shall give
notice thereof to the International Civil Aviation Organization which
shall communicate the notice to all [s]tates [p]arties to this Conven-
tion."" Under article 3, paragraph 4, the state so designated is deemed to
be the state of registration within the meaning of paragraph 3 of that
article.
3 Interesting problems are presented by the question whether it was wise to link the
scope of The Hague Convention to the nationality of the aircraft. Query, what is the
result in the case in which a state is entitled and willing to exercise jurisdiction under
the Convention but the aircraft concerned is registered in a state which is not party to
the Convention and objects to such application? Similarly, what are the consequences
when the aircraft, registered in a state party to the Convention, is operated by an airline
which is under the jurisdiction of a state not a party to the Convention and objects?
Although the answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper, they may
acquire an added importance if provision were to be made for sanctions against states
defaulting their obligations under The Hague Convention, as proposed by Canada and
the United States. See Sumnmary of the Work of the Legal Committee During its 18th
Session, ICAO Doc. 8910; ICAO LC/SC CR WD/2.
'Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944,
art. 77, 61 Stat. 1180, 1202, T.I.A.S. 1591 (effective April 4, 1947).
"1 See generally Robinson, Changing Concepts of Sabotage: A Challenge to the Status
of United States Carriers in International Civil Aviation?, 34 J. AIR L. & COMM. 533
(1968); Mankewicz, Les aeronefs internationant, 1962 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 685 and 1967 ANNUAIRE 487.
"Article 5 is based on article 18 of the Tokyo Convention which was the first con-
vention to deal with such "international" aircraft, and it proceeded above-mentioned
resolution of the ICAO Council by four years.
1970 HAGUE CONVENTION
Finally, while the Convention applies only to unlawful seizure of
aircraft committed on an international flight, the jurisdiction of con-
tracting states over the alleged hijacker and his accomplices is not limited
in the same fashion. Indeed, article 3, paragraph 4, explicitly provides
that articles 6, 7, 8 and 10, dealing with jurisdiction, apply "whatever
the place of take-off or the place of actual landing of the aircraft."
2. Criminal Jurisdiction
If hijacking is to become an international offense, it is not enough to
only provide for its punishment regardless of the place where the offense
is committed; effective repression also requires prosecution and punish-
ment in any state where the offender can be found. The Hague Con-
vention has practically reached this goal by going far beyond the rules
set forth in the draft convention prepared by the ICAO Legal Com-
mittee.
Under the draft convention only the state of registration and the
state where the aircraft landed "with the alleged offender still on board"
were obliged to establish their jurisdiction over the offense. The Hague
Convention, however, has enlarged these provisions significantly.'
Taking into account the increasing number of aircraft leased without
crew, it provides that jurisdiction must also be established by the state
in which the lessee of the hijacked aircraft has his principal place of
business or, if no such place of business exists, his permanent residence."
In addition, paragraph 2 of article 4 requires every contracting state to
"take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the offense in the case where the alleged offender is present in its terri-
tory and it does not extradite him."'" The provision is necessary in order
to increase the possibility of effective punishment, even if the hijacker
is not prosecuted in, or escapes from, the state of landing or is not extra-
dited to the state of registration of the aircraft.
Unpleasant experience demonstrates that attempted or completed acts
of hijacking may be accompanied by the commission of other, equally
serious offenses on board the aircraft. Therefore, article 4, paragraph 1,
through a useful extension of the provisions relating to jurisdiction,
provides that in addition to establishing jurisdiction over the unlawful
seizure of aircraft, the aforementioned states shall also establish juris-
diction over "any other act of violence against passengers or crew com-
"' See Hague Convention, art. 4.
36 Id., art. 4, para. 1, sub-para. c.
37 By providing that any state where the hijacker happens to be shall also establish
its jurisdiction, the Convention has actually made the unlawful seizure of aircraft an
international offense. If the offender is granted asylum and is not prosecuted in the
state where he lands, the new provision results in persuasively inducing him to stay in
the territory of that state because he risks prosecution in any other state to which he
may later wish to go.
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mitted by the alleged offender in connection with [the hijacking]." This
provision is even more useful when the state in which the hijacker is
located does not wish to prosecute him for having unlawfully seized the
aircraft, although it might be willing to prosecute him for other violent
offenses committed on that occasion.
Although article 4 requires the contracting states to assume juris-
diction over the unlawful seizure of aircraft within the limits of article
3, it does not answer whether each of the states is additionally obliged
to actually prosecute the alleged offender. The answer to this question
is the subject of article 7:
The contracting [s]tate in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception
whatsoever and whether or not the offense was committed in its terri-
tory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same man-
ner as in the case of any ordinary offense of a serious nature under the
law of that [s]tate.
Differing views are possible concerning the actual meaning and scope
of the article, especially in light of the discussions proceding its adoption.
Australia and thirteen European countries felt that an absolute obliga-
tion to prosecute a hijacker may be repugnant to many states wishing
to preserve the traditional right to refrain at will from prosecuting al-
leged offenders. Thus, they proposed an alternative provision, in line
with the language of article 7 of the draft convention prepared by the
ICAO Legal Committee, to read: "shall . . . be obliged to submit the
case to its competent authorities for their decision whether to prosecute
him." Nevertheless, the proposal was rejected at the plenary meeting of
the Conference by twenty votes, with twenty-two states voting for pas-
sage and eleven abstentions. The result was the words "shall be obliged
without exception whatsoever,"" previously inserted by the Committee
of the Whole, were retained. This series of events could be invoked to
support the thesis of an absolute obligation to prosecute alleged hijackers.
Whether there should be provided an exception to the obligation to
institute criminal proceedings against hijackers that were politically
motivated had already been raised by the Sub-Committee of the ICAO
Legal Committee. Both the Sub-Committee and the full Committee had
preferred to remain silent on the point."' The issue was again pressed by
the United States at the Conference, with the support of several states
including the Soviet Union. Specifically, they proposed to add the words
"irrespective of its motivation," following the word "obliged.""' This
8 Hague Convention, art. 7 (emphasis added).
11 ICAO Doc. No. 8838, at 6, ICAO Doc. No. 8877, at 7, 55.
40 PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO SUBCOMM. ON UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT OF THE
LEGAL COMM. OF ICAO, LC/SC.SA. WD7 (May 5, 1969).
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proposition again met opposition. Thereupon, the delegate of Kenya
proposed replacement of the suggested wording with "without exception
whatsoever," since these words already appeared in Resolution 2264
(XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The latter pro-
posal was adopted by sixty-one votes, ten states voting against passage
with eleven abstentions.
There was no unanimity among the delegates about the meaning of
the clause, "without exception whatsoever." Several delegates argued that
the words make it unlawful under the Convention for a state to rely on
the political motives or other circumstances of the unlawful seizure in
order to refuse to prosecute or extradite the alleged offender. Yet, while
the Convention certainly does not exclude unlawful seizure committed
for political reasons, an equally valid argument can be made that a state
may lawfully refuse to prosecute an alleged offender that it does not
wish to extradite. For under the last sentence of article 7, al that is re-
quired is for competent authorities to "make their decision in the same
manner as in the case of ordinary offense of a serious nature under the
law of that [s]tate." Many commentators,"' including this writer, take
the position that this clause should be construed to mean that if the hi-
jacking was politically motivated in the view of the competent author-
ities, or if for any other reason prosecution is considered to be inap-
propriate, the competent authorities of contracting state should have the
right not to begin criminal proceedings by the same extent to which that
state's general criminal law and traditions permit them to abstain from
prosecution "in the case of any ordinary offense of a serious nature"
which has a political flavor or in which they would consider prosecution
undesirable for the very same reason. In this respect, it must be remem-
bered that various states have a long and cherished tradition of non-
prosecution or "special treatment" for political offenses and offenders
and, moreover, grant an absolute right to their competent authorities to
abstain from prosecution for reasons of convenience. This is particularly
true, in cases involving offenses committed abroad or having political
undertones. Thus, despite a prima facie impression to the contrary, a
correct reading of article 7 leads to the conclusion that authorities
having jurisdiction under article 4 are at liberty not to prosecute a hi-
jacker and his accomplice if it is determined that the offenders would
not be prosecuted had they committed another "ordinary offense of a
serious nature" under comparable circumstances. In states having a
long-established tradition of sovereign discretion in these matters, par-
ticularly in the case of offenses committed abroad, a stricter interpreta-
41 Guillaume, La Convention de La Hague des 16 decembre 1970, 11970] ANNUAIRE
FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 36; Gilliam & White, The Hague Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1971 REVIEW OF THE INT'L COMM'N
OF JURISTS 37.
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tion of article 7 might well result in the non-ratification of the Conven-
tion. And the threat that the construction proposed in this paper may en-
courage hijacking is minimal. A hijacker will never be able to determine
beforehand how articles 4 and 7 will be construed, as well as what de-
cision will be taken, by the authorities of the state in which he desires
to take refuge. If the state of actual landing does not prosecute him, the
offender will think twice before venturing abroad.
3. Extradition
Several states proposed compulsory extradition by any state in which
the alleged offender is found, but not prosecuted. Although the proposal
met with little favor with the majority of the delegates who were un-
willing to see the Convention become an extradition treaty, important
progress toward the effective suppression of hijacking was nevertheless
made by specifying in article 8 that the act is "an extraditable offense"
in any existing extradition treaty between the contracting states. Further,
the act is to be included specifically in every extradition treaty con-
cluded between the contracting states in the future. Finally, article 8,
paragraph 2, provides that if such a treaty does not exist between the
involved states, and if the requested state conditions extradition on its
existence, that state "may at its option" consider the Convention "as the
legal basis for extradition," "subject to the other conditions provided by
the law of the requested [s]tate." If, however, an extradition treaty is not
required, contracting states "shall recognize the offense as an extraditable
offense between themselves, subject to the [same] conditions."
The Convention also provides that unlawful seizure of aircraft shall
be "treated for the purpose of extradition between contracting [s]tates as
if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but
also in the territories of [the three states specified in article 4, para-
graph 1]." However, since the unlawful seizure of aircraft cannot be
"treated as if it had been committed" in the place in which it occurred
(for it actually has been committed in that place), the rule is surprising.
Furthermore, the offense is continuous; it continues indeed to be com-
mitted from the moment commenced until the moment terminated.
Consequently, it is actually committed in all overflown states during that
period, including the state of actual landing. The latter is singled out in
article 8, albeit by reference, but the others are not even mentioned.
Although the language of article 4, paragraph 3, indirectly preserves
their jurisdictional rights,' the Convention, which is greatly concerned
with the states of take-off and landing, surprisingly never mentions the
states overflown by the hijacked aircraft. At first glance, article 4 of the
42The Hague Convention, art. 4, para. 3, provides that the Convention does not
exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised with national law.
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Tokyo Convention, which restricts the jurisdiction of the overflown state
by providing that, except in specifically mentioned cases, it "may not
interfere with the aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal juris-
diction over an offense committed on board. . . . " does apply to over-
flights of hijacked aircraft. The opposite is true, however, because under
article 9 of The Hague Convention, which copies article 11 of the
Tokyo Convention, every contracting state is obliged to "take all ap-
propriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful com-
mander or to preserve his control of the aircraft."
4. Miscellaneous Provisions
Other articles of the Convention establish secondary duties of the
states where the alleged hijacker is found and "in which the aircraft or
its passengers or crew are present." Article 6 and article 9, paragraph
2, generally reproduce article 13 and article 9, paragraph 2, of the
Tokyo Convention. In particular, the state where the hijacker is present
shall take him into custody, immediately make a preliminary inquiry
into the facts and notify the specified states of such custody and of the
circumstances warranting the detention of the alleged offender. In ad-
dition, the Convention requires the state to report its findings and any
further decisions. Moreover, the state in which the aircraft, its pas-
sengers or crew are present shall "facilitate the continuation of the
journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable, and shall
without delay return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully
entitled to possession."
With respect to mutual assistance among states, article 10 provides
that, subject to obligations under any other treaty, the contracting states
shall, in accordance with existing national law, "afford one another the
greatest measures of assistance in connection with [the] criminal pro-
ceedings brought in respect of [unlawful seizure of aircraft or any other
act of violence against passengers or crew committed in connection with
such seizure]."
On April 10, 1969, a permanent Committee on Unlawful Inter-
ferences with International Civil Aviation was established by the ICAO
Council with a mandate to collect and centralize information on hi-
jacking and to promote possible action by the Council. Hence, article 11
requests all contracting parties to report to the Council, "as promptly
as possible, any relevant information in [their] possession concerning:
(a) the circumstances of the offense; (b) the action taken pursuant to
article 9; and (c) the measures taken with respect to the offender or the
alleged offender and, in particular, the results of any extradition or other
legal proceedings." This article is remarkable inasmuch as it applies to
each state party to the Convention, whether or not that state is also a
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party to the Chicago Convention and, therefore, a member of ICAO.
Article 12 deals with the settlement of disputes concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the Convention. It provides that disputes
which cannot be settled through negotiation shall be submitted to arbi-
tration. Further, if no agreement is reached the matter can be referred
to the International Court of Justice on the request of one of the parties.
This is the only article of the Convention which permits a reservation.
5. A Missing Provision
It is regrettable that the Convention does not provide for some kind
of extra-territorial status or immunity from jurisdiction for the benefit
of the passengers and crew in the state to which the aircraft has been
hijacked. This type of rule, which should also apply to all cases of un-
scheduled landings in a foreign country, is urgently needed, particularly
in the event of an unlawful seizure of an aircraft."3 Not only does ex-
perience show that the persons disembarking from a hijacked aircraft
are sometimes searched and detained, frequently for purely political
reasons, but they may also be arrested and subsequently prosecuted for
any offense in which they allegedly previously committed in a state to
which they had no intention of returning and where they were brought
against their will." The Air Law Committee and the Fifty-Fifth Con-
ference of the International Law Association, which met at The Hague
in 1970, adopted a resolution to be submitted to ICAO and other ap-
propriate organizations calling attention to the well-established rule in
customary international law that grants a degree of immunity from local
jurisdiction to ships, their crew, passengers and cargo entering a foreign
port in distress; this principle generally should be applicable to distressed
aircraft." Unfortunately, The Hague Conference did not act upon the
suggestion.
6. Final Clauses
The final clauses are significant because they depart from ICAO
traditions. Conventions concluded under the auspices, of ICAO are
drafted usually in the three working languages of the Organization,
ISee 1968 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 524, in which, subsequent
to a case involving the seizure of a passenger's luggage, it was suggested that this rule
should be embedded in a general convention relating to facilitation of air transport.
Pending the development of that convention, it should be incorporated in particular
conventions such as the Tokyo and The Hague Convention.
44 For seizure of the contents of luggage at an intermediate stopping place, see Tri-
bunal Convictional de Dakar, 1957 REVUE FRANCAIS DE DROIT AERIEN 377. For the
arrest, at an intermediate stopping place, of persons on account of their legitimate ac-
tivities in a foreign state, see 1970 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
142. In both cases, however, those arrested knew, or should have known, that the air-
craft was scheduled to land at the place in question.
IICAO Doc. SA19; INT'L LAW ASS'N, FIFTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT (to be pub-
lished).
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namely English, French and Spanish and, with the exception of The
Hague Protocol of 1955 to amend the Warsaw Convention of October
12, 1929, and the Guadelajara Convention of 1961 complementary to
the Warsaw Convention, are deposited with ICAO. These precedents
were broken by the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft.
In order that states not parties to the Chicago Convention may easily
ratify and adhere to the new Convention, it was decided to deposit the
latter with three Governments-the United States, the Soviet Union and
Great Britain-where the Convention would also be open for signature
after December 31, 1970. Before that date the Convention was open
for signature at The Hague, but only to "states participating in the
International Conference on Air Law held in that city from the 1st to
the 16th of December, 1970."
The deposit of the Convention with the Soviet Union also made it
necessary to establish an authentic text in the Russian language, in ad-
dition to the usual authentic text in the English, French and Spanish
languages. Therefore, the Convention was done "in three originals, each
being drawn up in four authentic texts in the English, French, Russian
and Spanish languages."
The states represented at The Hague Confrence wished to insure the
early coming into force of the new Convention and, therefore, the num-
ber of ratifications required to that effect was set at ten only. The tenth
instrument of ratification was signed by the President of the United
States, Mr. Richard M. Nixon, on September 14, 1971, and deposited
on that day in Washington, D.C.
III. CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention deals only with "unlawful seizure" committed
on board aircraft and does not apply to sabotage committed on the
ground, nor does it cover unlawful interferences with air navigation,
facilities and services such as airports, air control towers or radio com-
munications. Attempts made to further extend the scope of the Conven-
tion were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the Seventeenth Session of the
Assembly of ICAO, held in Montreal in June 1970, adopted a resolution
directing "the Council of ICAO to convene the Legal Committee, if
possible not later than November 1970, in order to prepare ... a draft
convention on Acts of Unlawful Interference Against International Civil
Aviation with the view to adoption . . . as soon as practicable. . ....
Consequently, a second draft convention was prepared by the ICAO
Legal Committee,' and a Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
4 "See Proceedings and Minutes of and the text of the draft convention prepared by
the ICAO Legal Committee in ICAO Doc. 8910 LC/163, at 27.
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Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation was opened for signature at
Montreal on September 23, 1971. It is regrettable that similar criminal
acts, equally baneful to international aviation, were dealt with in two
different but parallel conventions."'
"7 This point has been raised forcefully by the delegate of the Soviet Union in the
Air Law Committee of the International Law Association (The Hague, 1970). The
Committee, however, did not recommend the merging of the two draft conventions
after having been informed that nothing would be gained by advocating a single con-
vention and because the agreement on such a convention might be delayed for several
years if the diplomatic conference scheduled to meet at The Hague in December 1970
were asked by the ILA not to limit its work to the efficient suppression of aerial hi-
jacking and to adopt rules relating to other unlawful acts of interference with civil avi-
ation. Moreover, there would not exist, by December 1970, a draft convention duly
considered by the states represented at that Conference.
